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Abstract This paper, outlining and examining the structure of the “ Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, a UN platform to address the issue of business and
human rights, aims to show that the three-pillar structured Framework lacks the base
of authority that would allow a State or a business enterprise, the actors in a
Framework context, to regard it as an authoritative source. The paper further points
out that international or global policy concerns, which seem essential to help realize
the Framework’s goal of narrowing and bridging the governance gaps created by
globalization, are sacrificed by the three-pillar structure. In addition, there may be
elements which fail to be reflected in it because of the adoption of three-pillar
structure. In order to overcome these deficiencies, the author proposes that a fourth
element be conceived in the context of or an understanding about the Framework.
This fourth element involves what could be called an international regime of
‘business and human rights’. Without the development of such a regime, the goal of
the Framework toward bridging the governance gaps will not be realized, and even if
the goal were to be realized to a certain extent, such a regime should be formed or
emerge to the same extent. In sum, the Framework needs to be followed by or
complemented by the development of an international regime encompassing the
normative content and a sanctions system if it wishes to achieve its goal.
Keywords: business and human rights, Guiding Principles, multinational enter-
prises, corporate responsibility, UN Council of Human Rights, soft law
Interdisciplinary Fields: business administration, business ethics, international law
1. Background of the issue
As negative impacts of transnational enterprises became a concern in the 1970s,
initiatives to codify rules for transnational enterprises led to the formulations of the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by the OECD and the Tripartite Guidelines
by the ILO. A panel was formed in the United Nations which began to formulate a
code of conduct for transnational enterprises. Negotiations continued for more than
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a decade but then ground to a halt and were eventually formally abandoned in 1992.
The 1990s witnessed growing concern about human rights abuses and
environmental destruction by transnational enterprises. In light of such claims, a
working group within a subcommittee on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, a subsidiary body of the UN Human Rights Commission, was reinitiated in
1998 to establish a code for transnational enterprises. In 2003, the subcommittee
unanimously approved the document titled ʻNorms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise with Regards to Human
Rights (draft Norms)
1
. The by then renamed Council of Human Rights got stuck
faced with severe opposition from some governments and the business community.
John Gerald Ruggie was appointed in 2005 by the UN Secretary General as
Special Representative (SRSG) on the issue of business and human rights with a
wide mandate to identify and clarify international standards and policies in relation
to business and human rights. The SRSG, having consulted with a wide variety of
stakeholder groups including governments, businesses, and civil society organiza-
tions, submitted a report to the Council of Human Rights in 2008
2
. The framing
concept which the SRSG proposed in the report is the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework.
The framework proposal was supported by many governments, the business
community and even the civil society. The year 2011 witnessed a new development.
In its resolution adopted in June 2011, the UN Council of Human Rights endorsed a
set of Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights
3
. The Councilʼ s
endorsement marked the completion of the SRSG mandate, and instead, a
5-member working group, launched in the same resolution of the Council, took over
responsibility for implementing the framework, effectively disseminating the
Guiding Principles, and playing an aligning function between governments and UN
agencies.
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2. Structural problems of the framework
How is the Framework structured? The basic concept of Framework was given in
the SRSGʼs 2008 Report, according to which the Framework comprises the
following three pillars: the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by
itself or by third parties; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and
effective access to remedies for victims of human rights. These three pillars form
the core of the Framework.
Another structure of the ʻFramework projectʼ, different from the Framework
structure outlined above, can be identified. These two structures need to be
distinguished for the purpose of the discussions that follow in this paper. The
Framework project consists of four stages in which the SRSG first proposed the
Framework in his 2008 Report. He subsequently made some recommendations on
ways to operationalize the Framework in his Reports of 2009
4
and 2010
5
, followed by
the formulation and publication of the Guiding Principles in 2011. The project
structure can be depicted by a timeline as indicated in Figure 1 below.
Framework first
proposed in the
2008 Report
2009 Report 2010 Report Guiding Principles
Figure 1: Structure of the ʻframework projectʼ
While the core parts of the Framework have remained intact, modifications or
realignments of phraseology were made, however slight, in each stage, so that
observers can find several differences between, for instance, the frameworks
depicted in the 2008 to 2010 Reports respectively. With the Guiding Principles
taking the form of a set of codes, it is not surprising that what can be grasped as a
framework through the SRSG Reports looks different from what appears in the
form of a set of codes. How they differ, however, is not a main topic of this paper.
What needs to be stressed here is that there can be different perceptions and
interpretations of the content of the Framework.
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3. The three pillars of the Framework
According to the SRSG Reports and the Principles, the three pillars of the
Framework are summarized as follows:
State duty to protect: States have a duty under international law to protect the
human rights of individuals within their territory or jurisdiction. International law
requires States also to take necessary measures to protect human rights against
abuses by State and non-State actors including business enterprises through
appropriate polices regulation and adjudication
6
. International law experts
disagree, however, on whether international law requires home States to help
prevent human rights abuses abroad by businesses incorporated within their
territory. The Reports of 2008 and 2009 confirm that international law does not
prohibit States from regulating extraterritorial activities of businesses incorporated
in their jurisdiction provided that there is a recognized jurisdictional basis with an
overall test of reasonableness being met
7
. States are also obliged to take appropriate
steps to ensure that in case human rights abuses occur within their territory or
jurisdiction, the victims of such abuses have access to effective remedy.
Corporate responsibility to respect: The corporate responsibility to respect
human rights means that business enterprises should avoid infringing on the
human rights of others and should take adequate measures to address adverse
human rights impacts with which they are involved
8
. The responsibility means to
include that business enterprises should respect internationally recognized
standards of human rights in their operations of business. As corporate
responsibility to respect human rights is based on legal as well as moral or social
responsibility grounds, a failure by a company to meet this responsibility may make
the company subject not only to legal sanctions but also, the 2008 Report notes, to
the “court of public opinions”.
9
The core part of the responsibility lies in carrying out human rights due
diligence which could be part of broader corporate risk-management systems
10
. In
case corporate activities go beyond the home Stateʼs territory, a business entity
headquartering a corporate group should conduct appropriate due diligence
through its supply chain networks, which may cover a global extension in order to
prevent potential human rights abuses or detect a possible abuse at an early stage.
This is in line with social expectations.
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Access to remedy: Access to remedy, according to the 2009 Report, is “an
important component of both the State duty to protect and of the corporate
responsibility to respect. ”
11
It means that some kinds of judicial or non-judicial
mechanisms should be made ready by State and business enterprises for the use of
victims of human rights abuses. It includes State-based judicial mechanisms,
State-based non-judicial mechanisms like NHRIs and NCPs, and non-State
administered non-judicial grievance mechanisms, which may include an indus-
try-led or a company-level grievance mechanism, aimed at detecting at an early
stage a problem which otherwise could get worse, leading to a human rights
abuse
12
.
4. Structural analysis of the Framework
The author will next anatomize the Framework. The two actors, the State and the
business enterprise, will be singled out as main addressees of norms contained in
the Framework or the Principles, and four aspects will be identified in order to
understand what the two actors are required to do in a Framework context, and
how they should do it. They are: first, the content of obligation or responsibility;
secondly, the kind of underlining norm; thirdly, the scope of the obligation or
responsibility (scope); and fourthly, the kind of sanctions to be imposed in the event
of breach of obligation or non-implementation of responsibility (sanctions). Table 1
shows how the two kinds of actors are linked to the four aspects.
Table 1 Actorsʼ obligations, norms, scopes and sanctions
Actor Obligation Underlying norm Scope Sanctions
State
To protect
(Remedy)
Legal norms (international
law)
Moral/social norms
Within territory in
principle
Abroad exceptionally
Sanctions possibly im-
posed by the inter-
national society
Business
To respect
(Remedy)
Moral/social norms (home,
abroad)
Legal norms (home state,
host state)
The land of operation
Subsidiaries (home
and abroad)
Supply-chain
Sanctions by home or
host states
Sanctions by the pub-
lic or civil society
Some explanations are in order. As for the content of obligation, for the State it
is a duty to protect human rights, and for the business enterprise it is a
responsibility to respect human rights, and each obligation covers each actorʼs duty
or responsibility to take and operate appropriate remedial or grievance
mechanisms for victims of human rights. The underlining norm for the State duty
to protect is a legal norm as the State has a duty to protect human rights under
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international law
13
. An analysis of the Reports and the Guiding Principles indicates,
however, that the documents use phraseology implying that States are bound by
moral or social norms. The Guiding Principles differentiate the usage of the words
ʻmustʼ and ʻshouldʼ in relation to State actions. For instance, Principle 1 stipulates
that States must protect against human rights abuses within their territory and/or
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. Principles 2 through 10
stipulate that States should take certain actions. This implies that the actions a
State should take do not have a legal grounding, but rather a social or moral one.
The main source of the corporate responsibility to respect is the moral or social
norms existing in society. To the extent to which the responsibility has already
been legally provided in the domestic laws of a State, though, the responsibility has
a legal grounding. Principle 23 of the Guiding Principles includes the following
phrase:
14
[B]usiness enterprises should: (a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect
internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate;
This part can be interpreted as reading that businesses should respect
internationally recognized human rights by complying with all applicable laws.
OECDʼs 2011 revised version of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provides:
Enterprises should, within the framework of internationally recognized human
rights, the international human rights obligations of the countries in which they
operate as well as relevant domestic laws and regulation: 1. Respect human
rights, which means they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others
and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved.
15
What business enterprises should comply with is not only laws of the State
where they operate, or the host State. Businesses are also bound by laws of the
State where they were incorporated, or the home State. The degree to which
businesses are bound by their laws differs from State to State. Some European
States, as the SRGS noted, have tried to formulate conditions for the State to help
exercise jurisdiction over matters concerning their overseas business
16
. This is a
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matter of ʻspacious scopeʼ involving the actors shown in Table 1 above.
When a transnational enterprise operating in a global arena is found to be
involved in a human rights abuse case occurring in a foreign country, the exposure
of the incident by media reports may instigate a boycott movement by civil society
organizations in markets of goods produced or retailed by the transnational
enterprise. This shows clearly how the business enterprise is subject to the ʻcourt of
public opinionsʼ to which the 2008 Report refers.
This aspect is closely related to the scope of the obligation and/or
responsibility which differs between the State and the business enterprise. States
are in principle allowed to exercise their jurisdiction only within their territory
under international law. States have respected this principle when it comes to
implementation jurisdiction. However, some European countries are trying to
extend regulations by enacting laws whose effect will go beyond their territory in
relation to corporate-related human rights abuses, enabling the law-enforcing
authorities to exercise criminal jurisdiction in such cases. The United Statesʼ Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) is another example, under which plaintiffs can lodge a
lawsuit against corporate entities alleged to be involved in a human rights abuse
case occurring overseas. Several cases have been brought to court under the
federal law
17
. This is why the phrases ʻWithin territory in principleʼ and ʻAbroad
exceptionallyʼ are placed in the ʻscopeʼ column in Table 1 above.
A business enterprise controlling its business group should be aware that the
scope of its responsibility to respect goes beyond the territory of the State where
the headquarters are located, requiring it to take appropriate preventive measures
against human rights abuses involving subsidiaries overseas. A specific procedure
to do this is “ human rights due diligence ”. The “human rights due diligence ”
requires a business to carry out this not only for its own business operations but
also for those of business partners, home and abroad, belonging to its supply chain
network
18
. Few States have so far enacted laws making this a requirement, though
more States are likely to do so in the near future.
Finally, in case of a violation by an actor of a human rights code or standard,
what sanctions are to be imposed on the actor, and how. If a State fails to take
necessary measures to prevent businesses from abusing human rights and/or fails
to provide victims with access to remedy, the State could be subject to sanctions
applicable under international law, though the possibility is limited in practice. The
SRSG Reports, however, do not discuss the issue as far as the State is concerned.
Nor does the Framework explicitly address the issue.
If a business enterprise gets involved in a human rights abuse, amounting to a
situation where it fails to fulfill its responsibility to respect, the base of the sanctions
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to be applied is the enacted law of the State where the business was incorporated. A
subsequent failure by the State to take actionto prevent human rights abuses by
third parties would lead to the possibility of the State being subject to sanctions.
It is hoped that these explanations will help give a clearer picture of the
Frameworkʼs context.
5. An analysis of the Framework
⑴ Features of the Framework
A birdʼs eye-view perspective shows that the Framework has three
characteristics.
First, the Framework defines the contents and contours of the three pillars.
The three pillars define respectively the Stateʼs duty to protect, corporate
responsibility to respect, and access to remedy. As the content includes norms, we
shall refer to ʻnorm contentʼ in this paper for the sake of convenience. To examine
norm content involves a norm-source concern; establishing the source of a norm.
This issue will be discussed later in the paper.
Secondly, the Framework defines relationships among the three pillars. The
relationships were presented in clear terms in the SRSG Reports. According to the
2008 Report, the three pillars constitute a comprehensive whole with each
complementing the other
19
. It describes the three kinds of responsibilities as
“differentiated but complementary”
20
.
Thirdly, the Framework does not define any relationship to an international
system concerning human rights, which is thought to currently exist in relation to
norms contained in the framework. The SRSG Reports refer to an international
human rights regime or a human rights system several times
21
. This indicates that
the Reports recognize that such a system or regime exists as an international
human rights regime. However, the Reports do not specify what that regime is like
in concrete terms.
⑵ Normsource, authoritativeness, and effectiveness
This section attempts to show why States and business enterprises cannot
consider the Framework a respectable source of authority. For that purpose, the
author introduces the following three concepts: norm source, authority, and
effectiveness. The concept of norm source is a concept which involves the
possibility that a norm derives from a recognized, and thus valid, source. The State
duty to protect human rights being provided under international law means that
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international law is the valid source of the norm. If a rule is commonly recognized in
society as a moral norm per se, reflecting social expectations, the source of the rule is
a moral norm or social expectations. If a rule can be attributed to a source other
than international law or social expectations, the validity of the norm source of the
rule needs to be established.
The concept of norm source is closely related to the concept of authoritative-
ness. Authoritativeness is a concept describing the level of authority a norm earns
from its addressees; that is, the actors to which the norm is addressed
22
. A norm can
be called authoritative when it has earned authority or respect from its addressees.
Authority or authoritativeness is a matter of degree. The authoritativeness of a
norm depends on the relationship between a norm and its addressees; a low
authoritative norm attracts only a low level of power or authority from its
addressees. Authoritativeness concerns the nature of a norm, and it goes hand in
hand with a valid source of the norm. A norm acquires the nature of authority when
its base is a valid norm source. Without a valid norm source base, a norm cannot be
authoritative.
Authoritativeness does not provide a norm with security from violation. Even a
high authoritative norm may be breached. If a rule is violated, sanctions may be
imposed on the violator. Such sanctions should correct the deviating behavior and
deter similar actions in the future. If a sanctions system functions as intended or
designed―in other words, it deters rules violations―the system in which the rules
are incorporated can be deemed effective. Law experts often argue that a norm has
effectiveness or that the effectiveness is an attribute of a norm. Introducing the
concept of authoritativeness, however, this paper regards effectiveness not as an
attribute or the nature of a norm, but as the nature of the socio-political
environment of a norm. The authoritativeness of a norm contributes in part to a
determination of the effectiveness of the system incorporating the norm, but it
cannot alone fully control the effectiveness of the system.
If addressees have acknowledged the authority of the norm, the possibility of
an actor violating the norm is limited. Yet a violation may be triggered by another
factor. As long as a sanctions system is functioning, the possibility of an actor
resorting to breaking norms remains marginal, which means the system is
successful as a deterrent. Without such a sanctions system, the possibility of
breaking a norm will increase as the level of deterrence decreases. A sanctions
system can complement the authoritativeness of a norm, which is not the cause
driving the system to operate. A sanctions system may be organized in a given
situation or unorganized in another
23
. Unless a sanctions system functions to some
extent, the authoritativeness of a norm cannot be adequately ensured.
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⑶ Testing the Framework
Next, the author will test the norm source validity and authority of the Guiding
Principles and the Framework by using the concepts explained above.
First is the Guiding Principles. The Principles provide the State duty to protect
as part of the norm content. As the State duty to protect, as examined above, is
provided in international law, its valid norm source is apparently international law.
An analytical examination of the Principles indicates that they are not a valid
source of the State duty to protect because the normative document just borrows
the concept from its original international law source. The same can be said of the
corporate responsibility to respect. The norm source of the corporate responsibility
to respect can be found either in societyʼs expectations, the moral sense of
individuals, or domestic legislation. The Principles also incorporate the norm
concept, borrowing from outside of the Framework to present it as if it were
original.
Since the Principles lack any base of source validity for the State duty to
protect and for the corporate responsibility to respect, the normative content
proper to the Principles is tantamount to nil: the Principles do not contain intrinsic
normative information despite taking the form of code. Almost all the normative
content of the Principles is borrowed from other sources.
Next to be tested is the Framework. As the scope and content of the
Framework have not been defined in concrete terms in either the SRSG Report or
the Guiding Principles, what the Framework denotes remains elusive and subject to
different interpretations. The project development structure contributes to the
elusiveness of the concept
24
. Wide and narrow interpretations could be made of the
Framework. The narrowest interpretation sees the Framework as simply an
analytical, explanatory concept because the concept is destined to play the role of
explaining the three pillars and how they relate to each other. As such, it follows
that it does not generate authority for its addressees.
A wider interpretation of the Framework sees it as a value-filled, normative
concept whose content includes the State duty to protect and the corporate
responsibility to respect. These norms, as mentioned earlier, are sourced outside of
the Framework. It follows that it has some degree of authority, owing to the effects
of the norm source that exists outside of the Framework. As long as its addressees
comply with a norm, the norm can retain authority, while when its addressees do
not comply with the norm, it loses authority, and this deviated situation may last
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until a sanctions system works to correct it. The Framework does not provide in
and of itself any organized sanctions system, but there is a sanctions system, though
less organized, working in the international arena.
To sum up, the concept which is recognized as the Framework, when grasped
in a narrower sense, is only an explanatory concept with vacant content, thus
having no valid source in it, resulting in a complete lack of authority. When it is
perceived in a wider sense, all the normative content of the Framework originates
from other valid sources like international law or social expectations. The
Framework itself is not the source of the normative content, again resulting in
having no authority.
The Framework and the Guiding Principles, which could be regarded as
constituting part of the Framework by some observers, are most likely to not be
valid norm sources in themselves. Given an explanatory function, the Framework
attracts little authority from its addressees. Provided that it is a valid source in
itself, it may acquire authority to that extent, yet it lacks a proper sanctions system
so that the base of authority of the Framework remains very fragile.
⑷ An analysis of global elements
The negation of authority of the Framework does not necessarily mean that it
does not have any significance. The Framework or at least Reports contain a
number of relevant recommendations made by the SRSG from domestic and
international policy coherence perspectives
25
. The problem is that these issues are
unscrupulously put into the mold of the three-pillar structure. A typical example is
shown below. The SRSG Reports focus on the negative effects of stabilization
clauses inserted in most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that host governments
conclude to attract foreign investment
26
. A stabilization clause makes it difficult for
a host government to strengthen domestic social environment standards, including
those related to human rights, without fear of foreign investor challenge. The
Reports claim that such a situation skews the balance between investor interest
and the need of host States to discharge their human rights obligations
27
.
The SRSG urges that States, companies and institutions supporting investment
should work towards developing better means to balance the two interests
28
. By
raising an objection to the practice of inserting a stabilization clause into a BIT, the
SRSG virtually recommends measures to help host governments make effective
policies aimed at improving the human rights situation. The 2010 Report points out
that a stabilization clause should meet the twin objectives of ensuring investor
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protection and providing the required policy space for States to pursue bona fide
human rights obligations. It goes on to affirm that there is an urgent need for all
parties to consider the human rights implications of long-term investment projects
at the contracting stage
29
.
These suggestions or recommendations were incorporated into the Guiding
Principles. Principle 9 stipulates:
States should maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human
rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy objectives with other
States or business enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or
contracts.
The 2010 Report refers to all the parties including States, corporate
negotiators, and their legal and financial advisors, that are expected to meet the two
objectives explained above
30
. BIT-related issues are covered in the Guiding
Principles in the section of State duty to protect, but not in the section dealing with
the corporate responsibility to respect.
The issue of securing policy space for the State to fulfill its duty to protect, as
the SRSG raises in his Reports, may be an issue that can be discussed separately
from the concept of State duty to protect. It should be noted, however, that the
normative content of the State duty to protect provided in international law does
not stipulate it in such detail. This leads the author to doubt the propriety of the
SRSGʼs handling of a how-to-design question concerning BITs as an issue of State
duty to protect. The issue of how to design BITs is not one that each State should
address separately, but rather one that needs to be pursued collectively by the
international community, with the shared consciousness of many States concerned.
Collective responses are also what corporate investors, contracting parties at the
other end of BITs, should provide. In this sense, corporate investors are also morally
bound to make concessions on the issue of balancing interests.
In light of all this, it seems advisable to follow a different path from the one
adopted by the Framework; namely, one in which all common elements are grouped
together into each of the three pillars.
Another deficiency can be pointed out in a similar context. The SRSG raises the
issue of international policy coherence. He says in his 2008 Report: “Effective
guidance and support at the international level would help States achieve greater
policy coherence”, adding that the human rights treaty bodies can play an
important role in making recommendations to States regarding the implementation
of their obligations to protect rights vis-à-vis corporate activities
31
. The Report also
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says that, in order to promote more consistent approaches and increase their
expectations of each other with regard to protecting rights against corporate abuse,
“States are encouraged to share information about challenges and best practices.”
32
However, these issues of policy coherence had to be described under one of the
three pillar categories in the Framework. In fact, the issue of international policy
coherence and the roles of international organizations in relation to the
improvement of human rights situations are explained in the Guiding Principles
under the pillar of State duty to protect. This is most typically represented by
Principle 10 of the Principles, which provides Statesʼ obligations in relation to how
they should act as a member of an international organization or a party to an
international treaty. Principle 10 stipulates as follows:
States, when acting as members of multilateral institutions that deal with
business-related issues, should:
(a) Seek to ensure that those institutions neither restrain the ability of their
member States to meet their duty to protect nor hinder business enterprises
from respecting human rights;
(b) Encourage those institutions, within their respective mandates and
capacities, to promote business respect for human rights and, where requested,
to help States meet their duty to protect against human rights abuse by
business enterprises, including through technical assistance, capacity-building
and awareness-raising;
(c) Draw on these Guiding Principles to promote shared understanding and
advance international cooperation in the management of business and human
rights challenges
33
.
A State that is a member of an international organization usually complies with
the obligations under the constitutional treaty of the organization only as far as it is
strictly obliged to, apart from obligations established under international law.
Principle 10 of the Guiding Principles seemingly intends to impose additional
obligations on a member State of an international body. The normative content of
these additional obligations requires, as a general rule, that a State, as a member of
an international body, work for or act toward the improvement of the human rights
situation of member States, independently of the obligations which States
undertake in a treaty.
This normative content cannot be regarded in the same way as an ordinary
interpretation of the State duty to protect denotes. It is not directly related to the
concept of State duty to protect human rights or duty to prevent third parties from
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committing abuses of human rights within the territory or jurisdiction. This
responsibility of States to work for the international organization as a member of
the body should instead be understood as part of their efforts to construct a global
institutional entity concerning business and human rights.
Paragraph (C) of the Principle cited above, stipulating that States should “[d]
raw on these Guiding Principles, to promote shared understanding and advance
international cooperation in the management of business and human rights
challenge,” may also be awkwardly connected to what the State duty to protect
stands for
34
. It could and should have been enshrined as a global effort for
something which every actor should cooperatively pursue. This would better suit
the purpose of Paragraph (C) of advancing “ international cooperation in the
management of business and human rights challenges.”
The author has shown earlier that the Framework, covering both the content
of the SRSG Reports and the Guiding Principles, includes policy recommendations
the SRSG made on top of normative content, and some of those recommendations
are molded into the three-pillar structure, resulting in undermining propriety.
⑸ Elements omitted by the Framework
There is an element which the Framework failed to incorporate, though the
SRSG had presumably recognized its importance. One reason for the failure may
concern the fact that the Framework takes the form of the three-pillar structure.
The element involves an objective as to what common or shared responsibility
States and business enterprises should have in relation to this topic.
John G. Ruggie contributed a monograph on the same topic to a 2007 volume of
American Journal of International Law
35
. In the concluding part of the monograph,
he cited a passage of Iris Marion Young on discussions of violation of labor rights in
a global supply chain. “[B]ecause the injustices that call for redress are the product
of the mediated actions of many, . . . they can only be rectified through collective
action”, and that requires a broader construction of “political or shared
responsibility.” Its aim is not “to assign individual blame for discrete acts through
backward-looking judgments, but to change structural processes by reforming
institutions or creating new ones that will better regulate the process to prevent
harmful outcomes.”
36
Following these cited passages, Ruggie positively assessed
soft-law hybrid arrangements, saying that it is an important innovation to realize
the concept. Ruggie did not, however, go into detail on the issue of “political or
shared responsibility” or the need of a “broader construction” in the monograph. In
his Reports, published after the monograph, he did not deal at all with the element
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of collective action or a broader construction of “political or shared responsibility.”
On the one hand, the phrase “differentiated but common responsibility” was
used a few times in his Reports, but on the other hand, the element of common
responsibility to construct an institution of actors is not referred to at all. Despite a
growing concern that States and business enterprises are expected, as members of
a global community, to play roles in constructing a global institution concerning
business and human rights, the Framework does not touch upon it. The reason for
the omission may be attributed to the three-pillar structure of the Framework.
6. Countermeasures: the introduction of a fourth element
It should now be obvious that the three-pillar structure of the Framework, or an
explanation on the base of this trilaterality, has deficiencies. Besides the lack of
authority in the Framework and the elusiveness concerning the definition of the
Framework, there are two structure-based problems looming. One is that
international policy issues concerning business and human rights have inapprop-
riately been molded into the three-pillar structure of the Framework. As a result,
any international or global element that States should address collectively has to be
handled by each State individually. Secondly, there is another global element that
the trilateral structure of the Framework may find it difficult to appropriately
incorporate. This paper aims not only to point out the deficiencies, but also to make
suggestions as to how to overcome them.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, the author suggests that a fourth
element should be extrapolated into the context of the three-pillar structured
Framework
37
. More specifically, an international regime needs to be conceived that
would be expected to develop as an overarching institution encapsulating the two
actors, the State and the business enterprise. And the construction, improvement
and sophistication of the institutional entity itself should be considered as a common
objective which States and business enterprises should strive towards in the field of
business and human rights. It should be an international or global regime in the
sense that Stephan D. Krasner defined decades ago as “sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors ʼ
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”
38
It could embrace
moral norms, principles and rules as incorporated in the Principles, and be equipped
with some sort of sanctions system. It should also have the function of coordinating
international policy as an organizational part of a global institution relating to
business and human rights, including the possible development of accountability
systems, domestic and/or international, for transnational enterprises, should they
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get involved in a case of human rights abuses
39
.
Drawing a full picture of the regime is not the aim of this paper. It simply aims
to stress the need for such a regime. An international human rights regime has
existed for decades. Scholars of international politics or relations, including John G.
Ruggie, pointed out the existence of such a regime in the 1980s
40
. The international
regime of business and human rights this paper is referring to ought to form part of
the existing international regime of human rights. How both regimes are and can be
connected or integrated is not the topic of this paper, but remains an issue for
further study. Let the author, however, shed light on one element which he thinks
should be part of this regime. It is the function of distribution of authority among
the actors. An example of such a function involves the coordination or distribution
of extraterritorial jurisdiction among States in relation to the issue of business and
human rights
41
.
Whether the duty the State has under international law to protect human
rights of individuals within its territory or jurisdiction can go beyond its territory is
a topic the SRSG sheds light on in his Reports. International law, as his Reports
recognize, does not prohibit States from exercising their criminal and/or civil
jurisdiction over a human rights abuse case taking place overseas, involving a
business enterprise incorporated in their States
42
. Some active governments are
pushing for an extension of their jurisdiction in order to exercise certain control
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40. No. 3 (Summer 1986).
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over corporate activities taking place overseas
43
. This may appear to be a State
extension of jurisdiction beyond a territorial limit driven by the egoistic pursuit of
national interest by a State. If an international regime could be established,
however, it would be able to more smoothly coordinate and more clearly distribute
jurisdiction among States than the existing laissez-faire system. This could
constitute the base of reasoning for a State extension of jurisdiction reflecting an
international or global interest, rather than the national interest of one State or
another, and it could also involve policy discussion over how to design such a
regime.
7. Concluding remarks
The Framework the SRSG proposed before the Human Rights Council was literally
a breakthrough in the sense that it broke through a stalemate situation that had
existed earlier in the Council. A wide range of stakeholders expressed support for
the Framework and its implementation in the real world. Democratic support for
the initiative, however, does not ensure that the objectives of the Framework will
successfully be realized.
Whether addressees will comply with the normative content of the Framework
depends on socio-political conditions that are functional to the governance gaps
which the Framework is set to solve. For the governance gap to be addressed, there
needs to be a global regime which will emerge or develop outside of the
Framework, but which will embrace the normative content of the Framework and
have a mechanism to execute sanctions over divergent behaviors of States in the
field of business and human rights. The construction of such a regime should be a
common objective for both of the actors, the State and the business enterprise, to
pursue
44
.
Without the development of such a regime, the goal of the Framework toward
bridging the governance gaps will not be attained, and if the goal should be realized
to a certain extent, such a regime must be formed to that same extent. The
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Framework is not likely to achieve the goal by itself, and so it needs to be followed
by or complemented by the development of some kind of regime encompassing the
normative content with a sanctions system.
In this paper the author points out deficient aspects of the Framework, but he
does not intend to squarely negate the significance of the Framework. Rather, he
appreciates its mission of “elaborating the implications of existing standards and
practices for States and businesses” and “integrating them within a single, logically
coherent and comprehensive template” concerning the issue of business and human
rights
45
. The SRSG notes that the Framework could be “a common global platform
for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without
foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments. ”
46
An international
regime of business and human rights, whose development this paper proposes, may
be seen in the future as a result of such cumulative progress or as a platform
promising longer-term developments. For that to happen, the actors concerned,
especially the State and the business enterprise, should be mobilized to collectively
work with a common view to constructing a world in which human rights will be
ensured.
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